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I. INTRODUCTION 
Part I of this article described and analyzed Portillo-Flores v. Barr, a 
case in which the Fourth Circuit, over Judge Stephanie Thacker’s dissent, upheld 
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of asylum to a Salvadorian 
asylum seeker who, as a child, was beaten nearly to death by MS-13 because his 
sister fled the country to avoid becoming a gang leader’s girlfriend. It contends 
not only that Portillo-Flores is inconsistent with general immigration standards, 
but also that the Fourth Circuit committed two main legal errors. First, the Fourth 
Circuit erred in requiring that Portillo-Flores should have reported the 
persecution to police, even though such a report would have been ineffective or 
put him in more danger. Second, the Fourth Circuit failed to apply a child-
specific standard when evaluating persecution against 14-year-old Portillo-
Flores. 
 
*  Anne Marie Lofaso is the Arthur B. Hodges Professor of Law, West Virginia University 
College of Law. The other authors are members of the West Virginia University College of Law, 
Class of 2021. The authors are members of the WVU United States Supreme Court Clinic 2020– 
2021, which since the fall of 2020 has been representing Casa Fairfax, pro bono, as amicus in 
Portillo-Flores v. Barr, No. 19-1591 (4th Cir.) (rehearing en banc), the subject of Part I of this 
Article. A rehearing en banc for CASA de Maryland v. Trump, the subject of this Article, has been 
scheduled for March 8, 2021, under Docket Number 19-2222. On Monday, February 22, the U.S. 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Department of Homeland Security v. City of New York, Order 
No. 20-449, 592 U.S. ___ (2021), which presents the same issue as Casa de Maryland v. Trump. 
At the time of publication, no briefing, oral argument, or opinion has been issued from the Court. 
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Part II of this article addresses a different class of vulnerable persons: 
the “public charge.” Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), “any 
alien who . . . is likely at any time to become a public charge is inadmissible” to 
the U.S.1 “Public charges” cannot receive a visa to travel to the U.S., be granted 
admission to it, or receive status in it. While vulnerable groups like refugees, 
asylees, and other individuals admitted to the U.S. on humanitarian grounds are 
exempt from the public charge rule, 40% of all immigrants that are subject to the 
rule constitute another, equally vulnerable group: spouses and minor children of 
U.S. citizens seeking family-sponsored admission.2 This is the focus of Part II of 
this article. 
Prior to the Trump Administration’s Rule, a “public charge” was 
typically defined as any person likely to be “primarily dependent” on the public, 
meaning 51% of their income came from public aid.3 With the new Rule, that 
definition expanded to include any person who uses any means-tested public 
benefits for more than 12 months in any 36-month period.4 This test disregards 
an applicant’s or immigrant’s degree of dependency in favor of an absolute 
amount—what many have criticized as a thinly-veiled “wealth test.”5 
Out of all immigration applications, only 1% or less have been denied 
on “public charge” grounds since 1999.6 But new guidance from DHS in the last 
two years caused initial denial rates to spike to 3% for the first time in a decade.7 
The Final Rule not only guarantees an increased denial rate, but instills a chilling 
fear of rejection in the 40% of would-be applicants who know they may need 
even a small amount of public aid to afford reunification with loved ones in the 
U.S.8 Perhaps worse, the new Rule further discourages admitted immigrants from 
applying for necessary public aid to afford life in the U.S. for fear of being 
separated from their families.9 
 
 1  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A) (West 2020).  
 2  See David J. Bier, An Explanation of the Public Charge Rule: Frequently Asked Questions, 
CATO INST. (Aug. 12, 2019, 12:20 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/explanation-public-charge-
rule-frequently-asked-questions. 
 3  Id. 
 4  Id. 
 5  See BOUNDLESS, COMMENTS OF BOUNDLESS IMMIGRATION INC. ON THE DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY’S PROPOSED RULE, INADMISSIBILITY ON PUBLIC CHARGE GROUNDS, 83 FED. 
REG. 51,114 (OCT. 10, 2018) 1 (2018), https://boundless-wp-
production.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/2018/12/Boundless-public-charge-comment.pdf; FISCAL 
POL’Y INST., “ONLY WEALTHY IMMIGRANTS NEED APPLY”: HOW A TRUMP RULE’S CHILLING 
EFFECT WILL HARM THE U.S. 1 (Oct. 10, 2018) [hereinafter ONLY WEALTHY IMMIGRANTS NEED 
APPLY], http://fiscalpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/US-Impact-of-Public-Charge.pdf. 
 6  Bier, supra note 2. 
 7  Id. 
 8  See ONLY WEALTHY IMMIGRANTS NEED APPLY, supra note 5. 
 9  See Bier, supra note 2; Erica Hellerstein, Immigrants Afraid of Trump’s ‘Public Charge’ 
Rule Are Dropping Food Stamps, MediCal, CAL. MATTERS (Sept. 22, 2019), 
https://calmatters.org/california-divide/2019/09/immigrants-afraid-trump-public-charge-rule-
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These issues underlie several cases challenging the Trump 
Administration’s Rule,10 and litigation has divided the federal circuit courts.11 
This Part analyzes the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in CASA de Maryland v. 
Trump.12 Section I lays out the majority opinion, which upheld the Trump 
Administration’s exceedingly broad definition of the statutory term “public 
charge.” Section II summarizes Judge Robert B. King’s dissent, which suggests 
the Majority improperly applied the Chevron deference test and ignores the 
historical definition of “public charge.” Section III discusses the circuit split 
arising from “public charge” litigation. 
II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S PANEL OPINION IN CASA DE MARYLAND V. TRUMP 
In CASA de Maryland v. Trump,13 a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit 
was tasked with determining the scope of the phrase “public charge” under the 
INA.14 CASA de Maryland, a Latino and immigration advocacy-and-assistance 
organization, brought forth a challenge to the Trump Administration’s 
(“Administration”) executive interpretation of the term “public charge.”15 The 
district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction, holding that the 
Administration’s interpretation of the phrase was unreasonable and 
impermissible.16 
In 2018, the Trump Administration issued proposed rulemaking 
regarding the definition of a “public charge” under the INA.17 As the court 
explained in detail, 
[t]he Rule made three relevant changes to the administration of 
the inadmissibility prong of the public charge provision. First, it 
replaced the 1999 Field Guidance’s definition of “public 
charge,” which asked whether an alien was likely to become 
“primarily dependent” on government assistance, with a 
durational threshold. Specifically, under the Rule, a “public 
charge” is defined as “an alien who receives one or more public 
benefits . . . for more than 12 months in the aggregate within any 
 
food-stamps-medical-benefits/; Looming Immigration Directive Could Separate Nearly 200,000 
Married Couples Each Year, BOUNDLESS (Sept. 24, 2018), 
https://www.boundless.com/blog/looming-immigration-directive-separate-nearly-200000-
married-couples/. 
 10  Infra Sections II.A, B. 
 11  Infra Section II.C. 
 12  971 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2020). 
 13  Id. (Wilkinson, J.).  
 14  Id.  
 15  Id.  
 16  Id. at 229.  
 17  Id.; Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,114 (proposed Oct. 10, 
2018).  
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36-month period.” . . . Second, the Rule jettisoned the 1999 
Field Guidance’s exclusive focus on cash benefits, instead 
providing that both cash and certain in-kind benefits count as 
“public benefits” and can be considered in making public charge 
determinations. . . . Thus, an alien’s receipt of noncash benefits 
such as Section 8 housing, SNAP (i.e., food stamps), and certain 
Medicaid benefits would each count towards the 12-month 
threshold. . . . Third, the Rule enumerated a host of factors that 
DHS officials are to consider, in addition to those set forth in the 
INA, before determining whether a given alien is likely to 
become a “public charge.”18 
The majority defends the government’s promulgation of this rule as 
considering “several empirical analyses”19 that preserve important protections 
for aliens.20 Litigation ensued once the new rule was issued, and quickly, courts 
became divided.21 
In CASA de Maryland, the plaintiffs made three primary arguments at 
the district court: (1) the DHS Rule violates both the Administrative Procedures 
Act (“APA”) and the Fifth Amendment because it is “not in accordance with 
law” under APA § 706 because the term “public charge” “means ‘primarily 
dependent on the government for subsistence[;]’” (2) this textual meaning is 
“unambiguous[;]” and (3) “as a result, ‘DHS lacks the statutory authority to 
reinterpret public-charge admissibility in a way that is contrary to that 
definition.’”22 
On appeal, the panel majority opinion—authored by Circuit Judge J. 
Harvie Wilkinson III—held that the Trump Administration’s promulgated 2018 
“public charge” definition was a permissible executive interpretation of the 
 
 18  CASA de Maryland, 971 F.3d at 234. The authors find this to be the most helpful and 
reflective summary of the changes between prior “public charge” definitions and the proposed 
2018 Rule in the public record.  
 19  Id.  
 20  As the panel majority explained in justifying the science and data behind the change of the 
definition:  
[T]he Rule retains the prevailing test that “[t]he determination of an alien’s 
likelihood of becoming a public charge at any time in the future must be based 
on the totality of the alien’s circumstances.” 84 Fed. Reg. [] 41,502. Next, the 
Rule governs only public charge determinations made in the context of 
admissibility; deportations, by contrast, would still be decided under the 1999 
Field Guidance and the three-part Matter of B- test. See id. at 41,462. And 
lastly, the Rule applies only to public charge inadmissibility determinations 
made by DHS, not the other two executive agencies (the Department of State 
and the Department of Justice) that are tasked with making public charge 
decisions in related contexts. Id. at 41,294 n.3. 
CASA de Maryland, Inc, 971 F.3d at 235. 
 21  Id. 
 22  Id. at 236. 
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INA.23 The majority reversed the district court’s granting of a nationwide 
preliminary injunction in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Wolf v. Cook 
County, Illinois24 and Department of Homeland Security v. Wolf.25 
Analyzing the question on the merits, the panel majority framed the issue 
as a separation of powers question. The court explained that were it to hold the 
definition impermissible, it would serve as a “stark transgression of the 
judiciary’s proper role.”26 Enacted in 1882, the court further explained that the 
“public charge” rule’s long history supports the finding that “the interpretation 
and application of the public charge provision was entrusted to the executive 
branch.”27 The court’s detailed historical review attempts to underscore the 
actual and apparent authority of the executive branch in making such 
determinations about how the phrase “public charge” is to be interpreted under 
the INA. 
However, the primary issue remains: Is the Trump Administration’s 
definition of “public charge” reasonable under the INA? Applying rudimentary 
tools of statutory interpretation to resolve this question,28 Judge Wilkinson 
directed the court’s analysis toward the plain meaning of “public charge” as the 
INA was ratified in 1952,29 an interpretive departure from the district court’s 
analysis that starts with the definition of the phrase as customary in 1882. 
Relying on Gustafson v. Alloyd Company,30 the panel majority concluded that 
the term “‘public charge’ should be given its broad ordinary meaning, as 
understood when the INA was enacted in 1952.”31 
Accordingly, the panel majority held that “the text, structure, and 
statutory context of the INA all confirm that ‘public charge’ should be given its 
 
 23  Id. at 229, 250.  
 24  140 S. Ct. 681 (2020).  
 25  140 S. Ct. 599 (2020).  
 26  CASA de Maryland, 971 F.3d at 230.  
 27  Id. at 231. 
 28  For example, when phrases used in a statute are left undefined, the court must “look to the 
ordinary meaning of the term . . . at the time Congress enacted the statute.” See Perrin v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).  
 29   As the CASA de Maryland Court noted,  
Congress enacted the INA in 1952. The ordinary meaning of “public charge” 
in 1952 was “one who produces a money charge upon, or an expense to, the 
public for support and care.” Public Charge, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 
1951) (defining as used in 1917 Immigration Act); Black’s Law Dictionary (3d 
ed. 1933) (same); see also Arthur Cook et al., Immigration Laws of the United 
States § 285 (1929) (defining as person who needs “any maintenance, or 
financial assistance, rendered from public funds, or funds secured by 
taxation”). And “charge,” in this context, meant a “cost” or “expense.” See, 
e.g., Charge, The New Century Dictionary (2d ed. 1946); Webster’s New 
Century Dictionary of the English Language (1941).  
CASA de Maryland, 971 F.3d at 242. 
 30  513 U.S. 561 (1995).  
 31  CASA de Maryland, 971 F.3d at 243. 
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ordinary meaning; that is, someone who produces a money charge upon the 
public for support and care.”32 Moreover, the court delineated that “as the text of 
the INA makes clear, the term enjoys, in practice, a certain ambiguity, giving the 
executive discretion over the type, amount, and duration of public assistance that 
will render someone a ‘public charge.’”33 But expressing a proposed limitation, 
the court held that “the term is unambiguous as to the statutory floor it sets for 
the executive; a floor that the judiciary is powerless to alter sua sponte.”34 As 
such, because congressional reenactment of a glossed term cannot alter or 
overcome its plain meaning,35 the Trump Administration’s 2018 interpretation 
of the phrase “public charge” wholly comports with the INA’s plain text because 
“the text and structure . . . yield a clear answer: the term ‘public charge’ is 
naturally read as meaning just that—someone who produces a money charge 
upon the public for support or care.”36 
III. JUDGE KING’S DISSENT IN CASA DE MARYLAND V. TRUMP 
Judge King dissented from the majority opinion, arguing instead that the 
DHS Rule must fail at step two under Chevron as an unreasonable interpretation 
of the statutory term “public charge.”37 In contrast to the district court, which 
found that the Rule failed at both steps under Chevron,38 Judge King stated his 
“willing[ness] to assume” that there might be enough ambiguity in the meaning 
of “public charge” to proceed to step two.39 However, he would have resolved 
step two in favor of the plaintiffs because, “in light of the statutory context and 
the history of the term ‘public charge,’ the Rule’s definition is far too broad and 
ventures well outside the bounds of any reasonable construction of the term.”40 
The dissent acknowledged that the Public Charge statute has never 
defined “public charge” explicitly41 and argued that the term is not subject to 
unlimited interpretation because it has “consistently described aliens 
significantly dependent on the government”42 since Congress first established a 
 
 32  Id. at 244.  
 33  Id.  
 34  Id.  
 35  See, e.g., Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991). 
 36  CASA de Maryland, 971 F.3d at 245.  
 37  Id. at 276 (King, J., dissenting). 
 38  See id. at 267. 
 39  Id. 
 40  Id. (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit’s similar conclusion in Cook County v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 
208 (7th Cir. 2020), that the Rule’s definition of “public charge” “does violence to the English 
language and the statutory context”). 
 41  Id. at 268. 
 42  Id. at 267 (emphasis added). 
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public charge provision in 1882.43 The dissent posited that the term’s 
construction under the 1882 statute is further “confirmed by contemporary 
dictionary definitions, other statutory provisions, legislative history, and judicial 
decisions.”44 Here, Judge King departed from the majority, which began its 
review of the statutory history with the 1952 iteration of the INA.45 But the 
dissent went further than a discussion of the 1882 public charge provision by 
analyzing the text, structure, legislative history, and judicial interpretations of 
various public charge provisions to show that the term has been consistently 
interpreted for over a century.46 
Judge King instead argued that the DHS Rule must be evaluated against 
the term’s history.47 In doing so, the Rule “extraordinarily expands the definition 
of ‘public charge,’ resulting in a definition of staggering breadth.”48 In sharp 
contrast to what he identified as the intended and limited meaning of the term—
an alien likely to become significantly dependent on the government—Judge 
King emphasized that the DHS Rule actually defines the term in such a way that 
“an alien will be declared likely to become a public charge if he might receive 
just a few months’ worth of supplemental benefits at any point in his life.”49 
Having identified the “outer limits”50 of the “public charge” definition, 
Judge King concluded that “[u]nder any reasonable construction, a person 
receiving such a miniscule amount of benefits cannot be said to be significantly 
dependent on the government.”51 Because he also found that the Rule “fixes a 
boundless definition of ‘public charge,’ it lands far afield of any reasonable 
interpretation of the Public Charge Statute,”52 and fails at Chevron step two. 
 
 43  See id. at 268 (citing Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 214 (1882)); see also 
id. at 270 (“Congress—when it first used the term ‘public charge’—did not intend to label as a 
‘public charge’ any alien in need of some public aid. . . . Rather, the term ‘public charge’ was 
reserved for those unable to care for themselves without significant government assistance.”). 
 44  Id. at 268 (citing Webster’s 1828 American Dictionary of the English Language, the overall 
structure of the 1882 statute, “relevant legislative history,” and judicial decisions from the late 
1800s). 
 45  Id. at 268 n.6 (“By 1952, the term ‘public charge’ had already amassed seventy years’ worth 
of meaning.”). 
 46  See id. at 270–75.  
 47  Id. at 267–70.  
 48  Id. at 275. 
 49  Id. at 264; see id. at 275–76 (“To be sure, the Rule purportedly retains the totality-of-the-
circumstances evaluation that has long applied to public charge determinations, but that evaluation 
is now singularly focused on whether an alien is ‘more likely than not at any time in the future to 
receive one or more public benefits . . . for more than 12 months in the aggregate within any 36-
month period.’” (quoting Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,502 
(Aug. 14, 2019))). 
 50  Id. at 278. 
 51  Id. at 284. 
 52  Id.  
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IV. FEDERAL CIRCUITS ARE NOW SHARPLY DIVIDED 
As previously noted, the Fourth Circuit’s majority opinion exacerbated 
the apparent inter-circuit split between the Fourth Circuit and the Second, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.53 These courts divide on the proper legislative 
enactment that controls the Trump Administration’s 2018 promulgation of a new 
public charge definition––either the definition of “public charge” incorporated 
in the 1882 act, the 1952 act, or the 1996 amendments to the INA. The underlying 
differences between these enactments are important because they guide the 
Chevron analysis of whether the current rule is a permissible agency 
interpretation. 
First, in Cook County. v. Wolf,54 the Seventh Circuit held that an 
immigrant rights organization, claiming similar organizational injuries to that of 
Casa de Maryland, possessed Article III standing to challenge the DHS’s “public 
charge” interpretation.55 There, on the merits of whether the agency’s definition 
was “arbitrary and capricious,” the court analyzed the issue under Chevron. 
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, this court concluded that under Chevron steps one and 
two, “the ambiguity in the public-charge provision does not provide DHS 
unfettered discretion to redefine ‘public charge’” and “the interpretation 
reflected in the Rule falls outside the boundaries set by the statute.”56 The court 
thereby concluded that 
[t]he Rule has numerous unexplained serious flaws: DHS did 
not adequately consider the reliance interests of state and local 
governments; did not acknowledge or address the significant, 
predictable collateral consequences of the Rule; incorporated 
into the term “public charge” an understanding of self-
sufficiency that has no basis in the statute it supposedly 
interprets; and failed to address critical issues such as the 
 
 53  Ann E. Marimow, Court Sides with Trump Administration Effort To Impose ‘Public Charge’ 
Rule, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2020, 2:41 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-
issues/block-on-trump-administration-public-charge-rule-lifted-by-court/2020/08/05/68f23426-
d74f-11ea-930e-d88518c57dcc_story.html; Mary Anne Pazanowski, Trump Agency Can Enforce 
Public Charge Rule, Fourth Circuit Says, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 5, 2020, 4:09 PM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/trump-agency-can-enforce-public-
charge-rule-fourth-circuit-says (“The decision creates a circuit split. It came one day after the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld an order stopping the rule from taking effect in 
New York, Connecticut, and Vermont. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit ordered the agency to stop enforcing the rule in the Chicago area in June.”).  
 54  962 F.3d 208 (7th Cir. 2020).  
 55  Id. at 219. 
 56  Id. at 229.  
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relevance of the five-year waiting period for immigrant 
eligibility for most federal benefits.57 
In San Francisco v. United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services,58 the Ninth Circuit held that because the phrase “public charge” was 
ambiguous and the DHS’s final rule was entitled to Chevron deference, a 
preliminary injunction was improper because DHS established the required 
likelihood that the final rule was not arbitrary and capricious.59 Noting the post-
1882 act and subsequent legislative history, the court explained that it was 
“unable to discern one fixed understanding of ‘public charge’ that has endured 
since 1882. If anything has been consistent, it is the idea that a totality-of-the-
circumstances test governs public-charge determinations.”60 The court further 
found that 
the history of the use of “public charge” in federal immigration 
law demonstrates that “public charge” does not have a fixed, 
unambiguous meaning. Rather, the phrase is subject to multiple 
interpretations, it in fact has been interpreted differently, and the 
Executive Branch has been afforded the discretion to interpret 
it.61 
However, in New York v. United States Department of Homeland 
Security,62 the Second Circuit held that the DHS’s interpretive rule was 
inconsistent with the INA and was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The 
court applied the Chevron deference framework, concluding that the 2018 Rule 
is contrary to the INA.63 Reciting an extensive history of immigration laws 
surrounding the “public charge” rule, the court held that the phrase historically 
has a well-settled meaning: “The absolute bulk of the caselaw, from the Supreme 
Court, the circuit courts, and the BIA interprets ‘public charge’ to mean a person 
who is unable to support herself, either through work, savings, or family ties.”64 
Departing from the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, the Second Circuit 
concludes that “Congress ratified the settled meaning of ‘public charge’ in 
 
 57  Id. at 233. In a dissent, then–Circuit Judge, now–Supreme Court Justice Amy Coney Barrett 
relied on a similar analysis to that of Judge Wilkinson in the Fourth Circuit. Compare id. at 234, 
with CASA de Maryland, Inc. v. Trump, 971 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2020). However, Judge Barrett 
primarily disagreed with the panel majority’s assessment that “the plaintiffs’ challenge to DHS’s 
definition of ‘public charge’ is likely to succeed at Chevron step two.” Cook Cnty., 962 F.3d at 
235.  
 58  944 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 59  Id. at 800–05. 
 60  Id. at 796.  
 61  Id. at 796–97.  
 62 Dept. of Homeland Security v. City of New York,   969 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. 
granted, 592 U.S. ___ (2021) (No. 20-449).  
 63  Id. at 64.  
 64  Id. at 71.  
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1996.”65 In response to the Seventh Circuit, the court explains that it is “similarly 
unpersuaded by the . . . ‘admittedly incomplete’ historical review and its 
conclusion that plaintiffs in that case had failed to establish that Congress ratified 
the settled meaning of the term.”66 Rather, the court held that “[i]n light of the 
judicial, administrative, and legislative treatments of the public charge ground 
from 1882 to 1996, . . . Congress ratified the settled meaning of ‘public charge’ 
when it enacted the [Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act].”67 In sum, the Second Circuit found that DHS had not provided “any factual 
basis” for its belief that noncitizens utilizing public benefits would be incapable 
to meet their basic needs without federal government assistance.68 While limiting 
the scope of the district court’s nationwide injunction to New York, Vermont, 
and Connecticut, the Second Circuit dealt a substantial blow to the Trump 
Administration’s enforcement of its 2018 interpretation of the phrase “public 
charge” in light of Congress’ 1996 ratification of the terms settled meaning. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The paradox of rules that vulnerable classes of persons face in the United 
States is both complex and cumbersome. Various groups of vulnerable persons–
–such as poor immigrants, children, and refugees or asylum seekers fleeing 
persecution and violence––face significant challenges and hurdles in gaining 
lawful entry into or remaining in the United States. As illustrated by the two 
principle Fourth Circuit cases outlined above, the paradox converges on legal 
untenability when viewed holistically and in a broader context of empathy for 
the vulnerable. 
For example, MS-13, now a sprawling international criminal enterprise 
that originated in the United States, has been exported from the United States, 
and violent gang members are returned to countries such as El Salvador. The 
side-effect in El Salvador generates considerable angst and turmoil for refugees 
(e.g., Mr. Portillo-Flores) who then seek safe harbor in the United States. MS-
13’s activities are extensive in El Salvador, and asylum seekers like Portillo-
Flores face a high bar when BIA immigration judges apply rigorous and 
demanding standards in reviewing removal cases for refugees seeking asylum, 
notwithstanding Judge Thacker’s dissenting opinion in Portillo-Flores noting 
that the proper, required analysis for BIA is more deferential. 
In other circumstances, once poor immigrants have entered the United 
States, terms like “public charge”––which have been drastically changed by the 
Trump Administration––make it significantly easier to deport poor immigrants. 
Legal immigrants, who have received public benefits, such as Supplemental 
Security Income (“SSI”), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”), 
 
 65  Id. at 73.  
 66  Id. at 74. 
 67  Id.  
 68  Id. at 83. 
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Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”), Medicaid, and public 
housing assistance for more than a total of 12 months within any 36-month 
period, can be classified as a “public charge,” thereby becoming ineligible for 
permanent residency. Casa de Maryland v. Trump only effectuates the 
inconsistent approach that federal courts have taken in responding to DHS’ 2018 
promulgation of a new definition of “public charge.” An individual who will 
prospectively become a “public charge” is deemed ineligible to become a lawful 
permanent resident and faces deportation. 
What is the result for vulnerable people like Mr. Portillo-Flores and for 
the vulnerable people that organizations like CASA de Maryland serve? In recent 
years, and more specifically under the Trump Administration, the U.S. 
government has reinterpreted asylum and immigration laws to make it harder for 
immigrants, children, and refugees to gain lawful entry into the United States. In 
2018, President Trump went so far as announcing an “asylum ban,” which many 
legal experts considered to be a violation of well-established international law. 
This “catch-22” for refugees and asylum seekers is untenable both as a 
matter of law and as a matter of American values. On one hand, gangs originating 
in the United States––like MS-13––are “brought to justice” by the U.S. 
government and international task forces, and gang members are then exported 
to countries like El Salvador. On the other hand, when refugees and asylum 
seekers face violence and persecution in their home country because of gangs 
like MS-13 and they subsequently seek refuge into the United States, the law 
fails to meaningfully protect them from a calamity that originated in the country 
they seek protection from. 
And when poor immigrants arrive in the United States, as they have for 
generations, they face significant barriers to entry. While they work in and 
contribute to the U.S. economy, under new federal rules, they can still face 
deportation by being declared a “public charge.” Per the Trump Administration’s 
2019 rule, the definition of “public charge” has been drastically expanded to 
include more vulnerable individuals. Despite immigrants wishing to seek a better 
life for themselves and their families in the United States, under the Trump 
Administration, poor immigrants are excluded in favor of wealthier, more 
prosperous immigrants. 
As a sovereign nation, the U.S. government indisputably has the power 
to control its laws and maintain, protect, and defend international borders. While 
federal courts and judges disagree over operative terms like “public charge” and 
the requisite standard for BIA removal proceedings of asylum seekers, the end 
burden of this variability in the law still falls flatly on the most vulnerable 
persons––immigrants, refugees, children, and asylum seekers—most of whom 
are people of color.69 According to recent Pew Center studies, one-quarter of all 
 
 69  See generally Abby Budiman, Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 
20, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/08/20/key-findings-about-u-s-
immigrants/; Phillip Connor & Gustavo López, 5 Facts About the U.S. Rank in Worldwide 
Migration, PEW RES. CTR. (May 18, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/05/18/5-
facts-about-the-u-s-rank-in-worldwide-migration/; Countries of Birth for U.S. Immigrants, 1960-
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U.S. immigrants come from Mexico.70 United States immigrants from the top 
five countries of origin—Mexico, China, India, and El Salvador—comprise 44 
% of all U.S. Immigrants.71 In 2019, more than half of all refugees entering the 
U.S. came from just two countries—The Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
Myanmar.72  
Now that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on the public charge 
rule issue, we may soon discover how these cases will be resolved. However, the 
Supreme Court’s ruling is likely to tell us more about the Justices’s philosophies 
on statutory construction and administrative law than give us guidance on how 
to resolve these thorny political issues. In the Fourth Circuit, these struggles have 
played out internally in response to the Trump Administration’s rigid—and often 
inhumane—immigration policies. The court has battled with balancing the 
applicable rule of law against the needs of vulnerable persons that these laws 
were arguably designed to protect. Moving forward, immigration policies and 
asylum laws that are rooted in empathy for the vulnerable would be more 
consistent and in line with post–Civil War American ideals, so beautifully 
spoken by the Statue of Liberty herself in the famous poem written for her: 
 
“Give me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free. 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!” 73 
 
Immigration policies reflecting these values—unfortunately too often more 
honored in the breach than in the observance—would bring out the best we 
Americans have to offer. 
 
Present, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-
hub/charts/immigrants-countries-birth-over-time?width=1000&height=850&iframe=true (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2021).  
 70  See Budiman, supra note 69.  
 71  See id.  
 72  See id.  
 73  See Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus (1883).  
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